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abstract. We deﬁne formalisms to reason about Coalitional Games
(CGs), in which one can express what coalitions of agents can achieve.
We start with Quantiﬁed CGs (QCGs), in which each agent has some
goals he wants to satisfy, which may change over time. Then we
focus on CGs themselves. Although CGs can be well analysed in a
formalism close to Pauly’s Coalition Logic, in QCGs, when having
preferences, some diﬀerences become apparent.
1 Introduction
Recently, one has seen as shift in focus in the research of multi-agent sys-
tems from representing the cognitive structure of the agents, to logics that
represent the strategic structure of multi-agent environments, and in partic-
ular, the powers that (groups of) agents have in such environments [Pau02].
Such logics have proved to have important applications, for example in the
speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation of social choice mechanisms [Pau02]. One sig-
niﬁcant feature of these cooperation logics is that they have a close link
with formal games: the semantic models underpinning Coalition Logic can
be understood as extensive games of almost perfect information.
In this paper, we survey our work on logical characterisations of concepts
from cooperative, or coalitional games. In a Coalitional Game [OR94, Part
IV] each coalition C (i.e., set of agents) is assigned a value v(C). Ques-
tions that naturally arise now are which coalitions will form, and whether
such solutions are stable. Qualitative Coalitional Games were introduced
in [WD04], as an abstract model of goal-oriented cooperative systems. In a
QCG, each agent is assumed to have certain goals: an agent is “satisﬁed”
with any outcome that accomplishes one of his goals, but is indiﬀerent about
which goal is satisﬁed.
This paper is a report on our following previous work, to which we will
omit to refer in the next sections. After giving a brief introduction to
Pauly’s Coalition Logic, in Section 2 we give a formal analysis of Quantiﬁed
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when coalitions can satisfy certain goals. In 2.2 (based on [˚ AvdHW06b]) we
shift the emphasis to the question when an agent is satisﬁed, and we add a
temporal component to QCG’s. In Section 3 then, we present a logic cgl
for Coalitional Games, which derives from [˚ AvdHW06a]. As a survey paper
of our own work and due to space constraints, this paper is highly self-
referential, and we know we don’t do others justice in only a brief related
work Section 4.
Coalition Logic. The logic we use as a starting point is known as Coalition
Logic [Pau02]. It was introduced by Pauly as a framework for represent-
ing and reasoning about the powers of coalitions in game-like multi-agent
encounters.
Informally, cl is a propositional modal logic, containing an indexed col-
lection of unary modal operators  C , where C is a set of agents. The
intended interpretation of a formula  C ϕ is that the set of agents (coali-
tion) C are eﬀective for ϕ. That is, the agents C could cooperate to ensure
that, in the next state of the environment, ϕ was true. We refer to an
expression of the form  C ϕ as a coalition or cooperation modality.
Syntactically, formulae ϕ of cl are deﬁned over a set A of agents and
a set Φ0 of atomic formulae by the Boolean connectives and the construct
 C ϕ with C ⊆ A a set of agents. Pauly [Pau02] uses [C] where we use  C ;
here we use the latter notation for easier comparison.
Semantically, a model, M, for cl is a quintuple: M =  A,S,E,Φ0,υ , where:
• A = {1,...,m} is a ﬁnite, non-empty set of agents ;
• S = {s1,...,so} is a ﬁnite, non-empty set of states;
• E : 2A × S → 22
S
is an eﬀectivity function, where S ∈ E(C,s) is
intended to mean that from state s, the coalition C can cooperate to
ensure that the next state will be a member of S;
• Φ0 is the set of propositional variables for M; and
• υ : S → 2Φ0 is a valuation function, which for every state s ∈ S gives
the set υ(s) of propositional variables that are satisﬁed at s.
It is possible to deﬁne a number of constraints on eﬀectivity functions. For
the purposes of this paper, we shall assume just one property of eﬀectivity
functions: we require that the empty coalition has no power to do anything
other than ensure that the model is closed, in the sense that the next state
will be one of the deﬁned possible states. Formally: E(∅,s) = {S}, for all s.
An interpretation for cl is a pair M,s, where M is a model and s is a
state in M. The satisfaction relation “|=” for cl holds between interpreta-
tions and formulae of cl. The satisfaction relation has the following main
clause: M,s |=  C ϕ iﬀ ∃S ∈ E(C,s) such that ∀s′ ∈ S, we have M,s′ |= ϕ.Logics for Coalitional Games 11
Sometimes, when we ﬁx the root of the interpretation, we also will write
(M,ρ), in which cases it is implicitly assumed that ρ ∈ S.
2 Qualitative Coalitional Games
We give a brief introduction to Qualitative Coalitional Games (QCGs):
details may be found in [WD04]. A QCG contains a (non-empty, ﬁnite) set
A = {1,...,m} of agents. Each agent i ∈ A is assumed to have associated
with it a (ﬁnite) set Gi of goals, drawn from a set of overall possible goals
G. The intended interpretation is that the members of Gi represent all the
individual rational outcomes for i – intuitively, the outcomes that give it
“better than zero utility”. That is, agent i would be happy if any member
of Gi were achieved – then it has “gained something”. But, in QCGs, we
are not concerned with preferences over individual goals. Thus, at this level
of modelling, i is indiﬀerent among the members of Gi: it will be satisﬁed
if at least one member of Gi is achieved, and unsatisﬁed otherwise.
We assume that each possible coalition has available to it a set of possible
choices, where each choice intuitively characterises the outcome of one way
that the coalition could cooperate. We model the choices available to coali-
tions via a characteristic function with the signature V : 2A → 22
G
. Thus,
in saying that G ∈ V(C) for some coalition C ⊆ A, we are saying that one
choice available to the coalition C is to bring about exactly the goals in
G. At this point, the reader might expect to see some constraints placed
on characteristic functions. For example, at ﬁrst sight the following mono-
tonicity constraint might seem natural: C ⊆ C′ implies V(C) ⊆ V(C′).
Although such a constraint is entirely appropriate for many scenarios, there
are cases where such a constraint is not appropriate1.
Bringing these components together, a qualitative coalitional game (QCG)
is a tuple: Γ =  A,G,G1,...,Gn,V  where
• A is a ﬁnite, non-empty set of agents;
• G is a ﬁnite, non-empty set of possible goals;
• Gi ⊆ G is the set of goals for agent i ∈ A; and
• V : 2A → 22
G
is the characteristic function of the game.
EXAMPLE 1. Let Γ1 be the following QCG for a collection of agents and
a collection of goals {g1,...}. Agent 1 is satisﬁed with g1 and g4, and agent
2 is satisﬁed with g2 and g3. The characteristic function is:
V(C1) = { {g1,g2} } V(C2) = { {g2,g3},{g1} }
V(C3) = { {g5,g6} } V(C4) = { {g2,g3},{g1},{g4} }
1For example, consider a legal scenario in which certain coalitions are forbidden by
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2.1 Goal Satisfaction
We now deﬁne a correspondence relation, “≃”, between qcgs and inter-
pretations. The idea is that, for a qcg Γ and an interpretation M,s, if
Γ ≃ M,s, then the qcg Γ and the interpretation M,s are “equivalent”
with respect to what they say about the way in which coalitions can coop-
erate. First, we say that qcg Γ and model M are comparable iﬀ:
1. The sets of agents in both structures are the same.
2. There is a propositional variable g in the model M for every possible
goal g in Γ, and M contains no other propositional variables.
Hence, if a model M =  A,S,E,Φ0,υ  and a game Γ =  A′,G,G1,...Gn,V 
are comparable, then A = A′ and Φ0 = G. As the reader may now be able
to guess, the truth of a propositional variable g in a state s will be intended
to mean that the corresponding goal g is achieved in state s.
In what follows, G ⊆ G. Deﬁne
π
−
G ˆ =
 
g∈G
¬g, σ
−
G ˆ =
 
g∈G
¬g, π
+
G ˆ =
 
g∈G
g, σ
+
G ˆ =
 
g∈G
g
So, if M,s |= π
−
G, then this will mean that no goal in G is achieved in state
s, whereas if M,s |= π
+
G, then every goal in G is achieved in state s. In
contrast, M,s |= σ
−
G means that some member of G is not achieved in s,
while M,s |= σ
+
G will mean that some member of G is achieved in s.
Next, we deﬁne a formula that characterises exactly when a given set of
goals is achieved in a given state: χG ˆ = π
+
G ∧π
−
G\G. The following property
is obvious. Let M and Γ be a comparable model and game, and let G ⊆ G;
then:
(1) M,s |= χG ⇔ υ(s) = G
We can now deﬁne the correspondence relation. Let Γ =  A,G,G1,...,Gn,V 
be a qcg game. We write Γ ≃ (M,ρ) iﬀ:
1. M and Γ are comparable; and
2. For all C ⊆ A and G ⊆ G, we have:
G ∈ V(C)
      
QCG
⇔ ∃S ∈ E(C,ρ) s.t. ∀s ∈ S : υ(s) = G
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The ﬁrst condition essentially says that the game and model contain the
same agents and goals, while the second says that a game indicates that it
is possible for a coalition to get some outcome iﬀ the interpretation indicates
this also.
Consider the cl predicate FEAS(   ), deﬁned as follows:
FEAS(G,C) ˆ =  C χG
It is not hard to see that if M,s is a cl interpretation that corresponds
to some qcg Γ, then M,s |= FEAS(G,C) iﬀ in Γ, G ∈ V(C). We say that
FEAS(G,C) corresponds to G ∈ V(C) and write FEAS(G,C) ≡ G ∈ V(C).
Some Correspondences in Qualitative Coalitional Games
First, we deﬁne a formula γ
+
C such that γ
+
C will be satisﬁed in a state s if
every agent is satisﬁed in that state, i.e., if every agent in C has at least
one of its goals satisﬁed in s. Similarly, γ
−
C will mean that no member of C
is satisﬁed.
γ
+
C ˆ =
 
i∈C
σ
+
Gi γ
−
C ˆ =
 
i∈C
π
−
Gi
Successful Coalitions. In many ways, the idea of a successful coalition
incorporates the most basic question that is of interest with respect to any
given QCG [WD04, p.47]. A coalition is successful if that coalition has a
feasible choice satisfying all members of the coalition. Formally, given a
QCG Γ =  G,A,G1,...,Gn,V  and a coalition C ⊆ A, we say that C is
successful iﬀ:
∃G ∈ V(C) s.t. ∀i ∈ C, we have G ∩ Gi  = ∅.
Given that a particular coalition is successful in this sense, we cannot be cer-
tain that this coalition will form; but we can be certain that an unsuccessful
coalition will not form – because, by deﬁnition, the formation of such a coali-
tion would leave at least one member unsatisﬁed. We can easily characterise
successful coalitions, via the deﬁned predicate SC(C) ˆ =
 
G⊆G C (χG ∧
γ
+
C).
PROPOSITION 2. SC(C) ≡ coalition C is successful.
At ﬁrst sight, the reader may suspect that the deﬁnition of SC(   ) is over
engineered: would the following, simpler deﬁnition not suﬃce to characterise
successful coalitions? SC?(C) ˆ =  C γ
+
C. The answer is no. To see why, con-
sider model M,s, where E(i)(s) = {{s1,s2,s3}} and v(si) = {gi,g}. Also,
in Γ we have Gi = {g1,g2,g3} and V(i) = {{g}}. Then clearly, accord-
ing to the deﬁnition of SC?(   ), we would have that i is successful, since
M,s |=  i γ
+
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{g1,g2,g3} represents a feasible choice for i in Γ; in fact, we have, for all
G ∈ V(i),G ∩ Gi = ∅. We come back to this example in Section 2.2.
Goal Realisability. The idea of goal realisability is somewhat related to
that of selﬁsh successful coalitions. We say a set of goals G is realisable
if there is any coalition for which G is both feasible and satisﬁes every
member [WD04, p.50]. Thus, the fact that a set of goals is realisable implies
that there is at least some chance of this goal set being achieved, as it
would satisfy at least one coalition. Of course, it does not imply that this
goal set will be the actual choice of any coalition. Thus realisability is a
necessary condition for the achievement of any set of goals – although it
is of course not suﬃcient. We characterise realisability via the predicate
GR(G) ˆ =
 
C⊆A
 
G′⊆G C (χG′ ∧ π
+
G ∧ γ
+
C). We have:
PROPOSITION 3. GR(G) ≡ goal set G is realisable.
Minimal Coalitions. We say a coalition is minimal if no strict subset of
this coalition is successful. The notion of minimality is important because it
implies a kind of internal stability for a coalition (cf. [OR94, p.281]). That
is, in a minimal coalition, there is no incentive for subsets of the coalition to
defect away from the coalition, as, by deﬁnition, such sub-coalitions cannot
be successful. Formally, a coalition C is minimal iﬀ ∀C′ ⊂ C, ∀G ⊆ G, if
∀i ∈ C′, G ∩ Gi  = ∅, then G  ∈ V(C′). Minimality is easily captured in the
predicate MC(C) ˆ =
 
C′⊂C ¬SC(C′).
PROPOSITION 4. MC(C) ≡ coalition C is minimal.
Core Membership and Core Non-emptiness. Perhaps the most widely
studied issue in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional stability, and
the tool used most widely to analyse this issue is the core [OR94, pp.257–
274] Intuitively, the core of a coalition is the set of feasible choices for that
coalition from which the members of that coalition have no incentive to
deviate. In the qcg setting, a parallel notion was introduced in [WD04,
p.54]. Formally, we say a set of goals G is in the core of a coalition C iﬀ:
(i) C is minimal; (ii) G is feasible for C; and in addition (iii) G satisﬁes
every member of C. Formally, G is in the core if (i) G ∈ V(C); (ii) ∀i ∈ C
Gi ∩ G  = ∅; and (iii) ∀C′ ⊂ C, ∀G′ ⊆ G if ∀i ∈ C′, Gi ∩ G′  = ∅ then
G′  ∈ V(C). We deﬁne the predicate CNE(   ) to capture core membership.
CM(G,C) ˆ = MC(C) ∧  C (χG ∧ γ
+
C)
The correspondence result is now obvious.
PROPOSITION 5. CM(G,C) ≡ goal set G is in the core of C.
The core of a coalition will thus be non-empty if that coalition is both min-Logics for Coalitional Games 15
imal and successful, which easily leads to the following predicate deﬁnition.
CNE(C) ˆ = MC(C) ∧ SC(C)
PROPOSITION 6. CNE(C) ≡ the core of C is non-empty.
Veto Players. The notion of a veto player is generally deﬁned in coop-
erative game theory with respect to simple coalitional games: those where
every coalition simply either wins or loses. A veto player is said to be one
that is a member of every winning coalition. Veto players are important be-
cause their cooperation is essential for every coalition that aspires to win: by
deﬁnition, without their support, a coalition cannot win. In our framework,
we can generalise the concept of a veto player to more general conditions.
We say i is a veto player for ϕ (where ϕ is a formula which characterises
some state of aﬀairs) if i is a member of every coalition that can choose ϕ.
VETO(i,ϕ) ˆ =
 
C⊆A
( C ϕ → ¬ C \ {i} ϕ)
Note that i being a veto player for ϕ does not imply that i can bring about
ϕ, and thus VETO(i,ϕ) →  i ϕ is not a valid formula scheme.
Let us now return to qcgs. In [WD04, p56–57], a notion of veto playerwas
deﬁned that generalised that of conventional coalitional games [OR94, p.261].
This deﬁnition related to the circumstances under which one agent is a veto
player for another agent: that is, whether one agent i is a member of every
coalition that is capable of satisfying j.
Formally, i is a veto player for j iﬀ for all C ⊆ A and G ∈ V(C), if
G ∩ Gj  = ∅ then i ∈ C. It should be noted that j need not be a member of
C.
VP(i,j) ˆ =
 
C⊆A
 
G⊆G
( C (χG ∧ γ
+
j ) → ¬ C \ {i} χG)
PROPOSITION 7. VP(i,j) ≡ agent i is a veto player for agent j.
2.2 Agent Satisfaction
On a ﬁner level of granularity, the situation in the counterexample of page 13
demonstrates an interesting diﬀerence between QCG-games and CL-inter-
pretations, i.e., that in the latter, is it possible to express that a coalition
can achieve a goal, without having to speciﬁy which set of goals it exactly can
bring about. We now consider a language that is more in line with CL. It is
deﬁned in two parts: Lc is the satisfaction language, and is used to express
properties of choices made by agents. The basic constructs in this language16 Thomas ˚ Agotnes, Paul E. Dunne, Wiebe van der Hoek, and Michael Wooldridge
are of the form sati, meaning “agent i is satisﬁed”. The overall language
L(QCG) is used for expressing properties of QCGs themselves. The main
construct in this language is of the form  C ϕ, where ϕ is a formula of the
satisfaction language, and means that C have a choice such that this choice
makes ϕ true. For example,  3 (sat1 ∧ sat4) will mean that 3 has a choice
that simultaneously satisﬁes agents 1 and 4.
Formally, the grammar ϕc deﬁnes the satisfaction language Lc, while ϕq
deﬁnes the QCG language L(QCG).
ϕc ::= sati | ¬ϕc | ϕc ∨ ϕc ϕq ::=  C ϕc | ¬ϕq | ϕq ∨ ϕq
where i ∈ A and C ⊆ A.
Write [C]ϕ to abbreviate ¬ C ¬ϕ. The formula [C]ϕ will be deﬁned to
be true exactly when ϕ is a necessary consequence of the coalition C making
a choice; ϕ will be true no matter which choice the coalition makes.
When Γ =  A,G,G1,...,Gn,V  is a QCG, G ⊆ G and ϕ ∈ Lc, Γ,G |=Q
sati is deﬁned as follows:
Γ,G |=Q sati iﬀ Gi ∩ G  = ∅
When Γ =  A,G,G1,...,Gn,V  is a QCG then Γ |=Q  C ψ is deﬁned as:
Γ |=Q  C ψ iﬀ there is a G ∈ V(C) such that Γ,G |=Q ψ
EXAMPLE 8. Let Γ1 be as in Example 1. Then:
Γ1 |=Q  C1 (sat1 ∧ sat2)
Γ1 |=Q ( C2 sat1 ∧  C2 sat2) ∧ ¬( C2 (sat1 ∧ sat2))
Γ1 |=Q ¬( C3 sat1 ∨  C3 sat2)
Summarising, the satisfaction of agents is evaluated against a set of goals,
while Boolean combinations of expressions referring to choices of coalitions
are evaluated on a QCG Game Γ.
Expressive Power of L(QCG) and Axiomatisation
We look at the properties of QCGs which are deﬁnable in our language. It is
clear from our language deﬁnition that what L(QCG) can express is which
coalition can satisfy which set of agents concurrently. Note that we are not
interested in how the coalitions make certain sets of agents satisﬁed, nor why
an agent is satisﬁed (i.e., which goal satisﬁed him). We will now demonstrate
that the properties of QCGs we can express in the language L(QCG) are
exactly the properties closed under a notion of QCG-simulation. In other
words, the language can not diﬀerentiate two games Γ and Γ′ iﬀ they QCG-
simulate each other.Logics for Coalitional Games 17
Obviously, equivalence of models transcends mere isomorphism. In par-
ticular, the semantics of performing a choice seem to depend only on which
agents are satisﬁed by the choice. For example, one could imagine a map-
ping between “equivalent” goals of two models, maybe collapsing two goals
of one model into one goal of the other. However, such a relation between
models does not capture all instances of equivalent models. What is needed
is a relation between sets of goals. This motivates the following deﬁnition of
a QCG-simulation as a relation between two models. It is only necessary to
relate goals which can actually be chosen by some coalition. Furthermore,
it only makes sense to relate models which are deﬁned over the same set of
agents.
A relation
Z ⊆
 
C⊆A
(V(C) × V′(C))
is a QCG-simulation between two QCGs Γ =  A,G,G1,...,Gn,V  and Γ′ =
 A,G′,G′
1,...,G′
n,V′  iﬀ the following conditions hold for all coalitions C.
1. If GZG′ then G ∩ Gi = ∅ iﬀ G′ ∩ G′
i = ∅, for all i (the satisfaction
condition)
2. For every G ∈ V(C) there is a G′ ∈ V′(C) such that GZG′ (Z is total)
3. For every G′ ∈ V′ there is a G ∈ V (C) such that GZG′ (Z is surjective)
If there exist a QCG-simulation between two games Γ and Γ′, we write
Γ ⇋ Γ′. If Γ ⇋ Γ′, we can simulate any choice in one model with a choice
in the other, and vice versa. This notion of simulation is somewhat simi-
lar to the notion of “alternating simulation” between alternating transition
systems in [AHKV98].
EXAMPLE 9. Let Γ2 be the QCG with the same agents as in Γ1 (Example
1), goals f1,f2,... such that agent 1 is satisﬁed in f1 and f3 and agent 2 is
satisﬁed in f2,f3 and f4, and the following characteristic function:
V(C1) = { {f3} } V(C2) = { {f2},{f1} }
V(C3) = { {f5} } V(C4) = { {f1},{f2},{f4} }
Then Γ1 ⇋ Γ2.
THEOREM 10. Satisfaction is invariant under QCG-simulation:
Γ ⇋ Γ′ ⇒ ∀ϕ∈L(QCG)[Γ |=Q ϕ ⇔ Γ′ |=Q ϕ]
Elsewhere, we showed that all that one needs to axiomatise validity in
QCG’s is the modal logic K, we omit the details here.18 Thomas ˚ Agotnes, Paul E. Dunne, Wiebe van der Hoek, and Michael Wooldridge
Solution Concepts. It should be clear that many of the solution concepts
of Section 2.1 can be characterised via formulae of L(QCG). For example,
we can characterise successful coalitions as succ(C) ≡  C (
 
i∈C sati). Sim-
ilarly, the notion of a minimal coalition may be captured as by min(C) ≡  
C′⊆C ¬succ(C′). Thus, the core of a coalition being non-empty may be
captured as cne(C) ≡ (succ(C) ∧ min(C)).
Apart from an agent vetoing an outome, he can also veto an other
player [WD04, p.57]: veto(i,j) ≡
 
C⊆A ( C satj → ¬ C \ {i} satj). Fi-
nally, the idea of a coalition being mutually dependent [WD04, p.58] is then
is: md(C) ≡
 
i =j∈C veto(i,j).
2.3 Temporal QCGs
In principle there are many ways to temporalise QCGs. As a ﬁrst inves-
tigation, we assume a linear time model, in which, at each time point, a
(possibly diﬀerent) QCG Γ is played. A temporal qualitative coalitional
game (TQCG) is then a triple
M =  S,σ,Q  where:
• S is a set of states;
• σ : N → S associates a state σ(u) with every point u ∈ N; and
• Q : S → Q, where Q is the class of all QCGS, associates a qualitative
coalitional game Q(s) =  As,Gs,Gs
1,...,Gs
n,Vs  with every state s.
We will make just one requirement of TQCGs: that the set of agents and
overall goals remains the same in all states. Formally, ∀s,t ∈ S: As = At =
A and Gs = Gt = G. This does not mean that an agent’s goals must remain
ﬁxed, however: we allow for the possibility that an agent has diﬀerent goals
in diﬀerent states.
A Logic for TQCGs
To express properties of TQCGs, we extend the QCG language L(QCG)
with the standard temporal operators of linear-time temporal logic: g–
“next”, ♦ – “eventually”, – “always in the future”, and U – “until”.
Formally, the language L(TQCG) is deﬁned by the grammar ϕt.
ϕt ::=  C ϕc | ¬ϕt | ϕt ∨ ϕt | ϕt U ϕt | g ϕt
We again assume the usual derived propositional connectives, in addition to
♦ϕ for ⊤U ϕ and ϕ for ¬♦¬ϕ. Moroever, we deﬁne ∗ϕ as (ϕ∧ ϕ)
(ϕ is true now and always in the future), and ♦
∗ϕ = ¬ ∗¬ϕ (ϕ is true
now or sometime in the future).Logics for Coalitional Games 19
When M = (S,σ,Q) is a TQCG, u ∈ N, and ϕ is a L(TQCG) formula,
the satisfaction relation M,u |=T ϕ is deﬁned as follows (the cases for
negation and disjunction are deﬁned as usual):
M,u |=T ϕ iﬀ Q(σ(u)) |=Q ϕ, when ϕ ∈ L(QCG)
M,u |=T g ψ iﬀ M,u + 1 |=T ψ
M,u |=T ψ1 U ψ2 iﬀ there is some i such that M,u+ i |=T ψ2 and for
all 0 < j < i M,u + j |=T ψ1
For instance, the L(TQCG) formula ♦  3 (sat1 ∧sat4) means that even-
tually, agent 3 can always choose to satisfy agents 1 and 4 simultaneously.
We will henceforth use L(TQCG) to refer to both the language, and the
logic we have deﬁned over this language.
Properites of TQCGs
The notion of simulation for QCGs (Section 2.2) can be naturally lifted to
the temporal case. When M = (S,σ,Q) and M′ = (S′,σ′,Q′) are TQCGS
and k ≥ 0, we deﬁne
M,k ⇋T M′,k ⇔ Q(σ(k)) ⇋ Q′(σ′(k))
M ⇋T M′ ⇔ ∀n≥0M,n ⇋T M′,n
The notion of elementary equivalence for TQCGS over the languageL(TQCG)
can be deﬁned as follows. M,k ≡ M′,k iﬀ, for every ϕ ∈ L(TQCG),
M,k |=T ϕ iﬀ M′,k |=T ϕ. M ≡ M′ iﬀ M,k ≡ M′,k for every k ≥ 0.
THEOREM 11. For all TQCGs M,M′: M ⇋T M′ ⇔ M ≡ M′
The satisﬁability problem for L(TQCG) is as follows: given a formula
ϕ ∈ L(TQCG), does there exist a TQCG M and u ∈ N such that M,u |=
ϕ?
THEOREM 12. The sat. probl. for L(TQCG) is pspace-complete.
Characterizing TQCGs
In this section, we investigate the axiomatic characterisation of various
classes of TQCG. As usual, in saying that a formula scheme ϕ characterises
a property P of models, we mean that ϕ is valid in a model M iﬀ M has
property P; if only the right-to-left part of this biconditional holds, then we
say property P implies ϕ. Also note that for an L(TQCG) formula ϕ, to
say that ϕ is valid in a class of models, is the same as saying that ∗ϕ is
valid in that class.
Basic Correspondences.
Let hs(C) denote the set of all agents that could possibly be satisﬁed
(not necessarily jointly) by coalition C in state s:
h
s(C) = {i : i ∈ A & ∃G ∈ V
s(C),G
s
i ∩ G  = ∅}20 Thomas ˚ Agotnes, Paul E. Dunne, Wiebe van der Hoek, and Michael Wooldridge
The “h” here is for “happpiness”: we think of hs(C) as all the agents that
C could possibly make happy in s. Thus the semantic property i ∈ hs(C)
is a counterpart to the syntactic expression  C sati.
Consider the following two constraints. The ﬁrst, EH, says that eventu-
ally, C will be able to make i happy.
∃u ∈ N,(i ∈ hσ(u)(C)) (EH)
Notice that in the terminology of reactive systems, this is a fairness or re-
sponse property: it implies that something (i being made happy) can hap-
pen inﬁnitely often. (Of course, the fact that C can make i happy inﬁnitely
often does not mean they will do so.) Note that ♦
∗ C sati characterises
EH.
Now consider a safety property. The constraint AH says that C can
always make i happy, while the constraint AU says that C can never make
i happy.
∀s ∈ S,(i ∈ hs(C)) (AH) ∀s ∈ S,(i  ∈ hs(C)) (AU)
We have that  C sati characterises AH, and similarly for ¬ C sati and AU.
There are several properties we can investigate with respect to goal sets.
First, suppose that agent i’s goal set is guaranteed to monotonically decrease
over time. Suppose we impose this condition strict, so that an agent i is
guaranteed to get strictly harder to satisfy over time. This condition is
deﬁned by the following further constraint, in addition to MDGS.
∀u ∈ N
(G
σ(u)
i = ∅) ∨
(∃v ∈ N : (v > u) ∧ (G
σ(v)
i ⊂ G
σ(u)
i ))
(SMDGS)
We get the following. SMDGS is charaterised by ϕ = ¬sati ∨♦ ¬sati.
Note that our language is too weak to distinguish SMDGS from the follow-
ing property, which is also characterised by ϕ: ∀u ∈ N(G
σ(u)
i = ∅) ∨ (∃v ∈
N : (v > u) ∧ (G
σ(vs)
i = ∅).
Solution Concepts. How might our solution concepts be extended into the
temporal dimension of TQCGs and L(TQCG)? It should ﬁrst be clear that
each concept has four diﬀerent temporal versions, corresponding to preﬁxing
the formula characterising it with one of the following four, increasingly
powerful temporal operators:
♦ ♦ ♦
Thus, for example, ♦succ(C) means that coalition C are successful in-
ﬁnitely often – no matter which time point we pick, there will be a sub-
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reactive systems, we might then say that C are hence fairly successful.)
Similarly, a temporally strong form of coalitional stability is captured by
the formula cne(A): if this formula is satisﬁed in a TQCG, then, it can
be argued, the only coalition that will ever form is the grand coalition.
It is potentially more interesting, however, to study a richer interplay
between temporal and QCG dimensions. For example, from agent is point
of view, perhaps the only really interesting issue is whether at every time
point there is some stable coalition, containing this agent.
tstable(i) ≡
 
C⊆A:i∈C
cne(C)
From the point of view of a coalition C, which seeks to form, the notion of
a stable government seems relevant: a stable government is a coalition that
can always satisfy its “electorate”.
sg(C) ≡  C (
 
i∈A
sati)
This can of course be strengthened, requiring C to in addition be an
internally stable coalition.
sg′(C) ≡ (cne(C) ∧  C (
 
i∈A
sati))
With respect to mutual dependence, one possibility, captured by the formula
md(C), is that a coalition is always mutually dependent. However, we
can capture a weaker type of mutual dependence as follows:
wmd(C) ≡
 
i =j∈C
♦veto(i,j)
We draw two conclusions. The ﬁrst is that the language L(TQCG) is well
suited to capturing such solution concepts. The second is that extending
QCGs into the temporal dimension adds an entirely new level of richness to
their structure, which, as these examples suggest, demands further study.
3 Coalitional Games
A coalitional game (without transferable payoﬀ) is an (m+3)-tuple [OR94,
p.268]: Γ =  A,Ω,⊒1,...,⊒m,V   where , ⊒i⊆ Ω × Ω is a complete, reﬂex-
ive, and transitive preference relation, for each agent i ∈ A. Its language is
deﬁned in two parts. First, given a set of outcome symbols Ω (we will blur
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them), we have an outcome language Lo, deﬁned by the grammar ϕo, below,
which expresses the properties of outcomes. The outcome symbols them-
selves are the main constructs of this language; a formula such as ω1 ∨ ω2
means that the outcome corresponds to either ω1 or ω2. Next, given a set of
agent symbols A and a set of coalition symbols ΣC, we have a cooperation
language Lc, for expressing the properties of coalitional cooperation, and
the preferences that agents have over possible outcomes. This language is
generated by the grammar ϕc below. Lc has two main constructs. First,
ω1  i ω2 expresses the fact that agent i either prefers outcome ω1 over out-
come ω2, or is indiﬀerent between the two. Second,  C ϕ (where C ∈ ΣC)
says that C can choose an outcome in which the formula ϕ will be true.
This construct may seem syntactically similar to its counterpart in Coali-
tion Logic, but it stands here for a fundamentally diﬀerent concept due to
the semantic diﬀerences mentioned above.
ϕo ::= ω | ¬ϕo | ϕo ∨ ϕo
ϕc ::= (ω  i ω′) |  C ϕo | ¬ϕc | ϕc ∨ ϕc
where i is an agent symbol, C is a coalition symbol, and ω,ω′ are outcome
symbols.
An Lc formula γ is interpreted in a coalitional game Γ as follows. First,
we deﬁne the satisfaction of a Lo formula α in an outcome ω of a coalitional
game Γ, written Γ,ω |= α:
Γ,ω |= ω′ iﬀ ω = ω′
Satisfaction of γ in Γ is then deﬁned as follows:
Γ |= (ω1  i ω2) iﬀ (ω1 ⊒i ω2)
Γ |=  C ϕ iﬀ ∃ω ∈ V (C) such that Γ,ω |= ϕ
Note that  C ⊤ iﬀ C can at least bring about something: V (C)  = ∅.
[C]ϕ means ¬ C ¬ϕ, i.e., every choice of C must involve ϕ. As an example,
suppose Ω = {ω1,ω2,ω3,ω4} and V (C) = {ω1,ω2}. Then:
 C ω1 ∧  C (ω1 ∨ ω3) ∧ ¬ C ω3 ∧ [C](ω1 ∨ ω2) ∧ ¬[C](ω1 ∨ ω3)
Note that if ω1  = ω2, then we can have  C ω1 ∧  C ω2, but the formula
 C (ω1 ∧ ω2) can never be true.
Let us, for any coalition C and set of outcome symbols ∆, suggestively
write  [C] ∆ for
 
δ∈∆ C δ ∧ [C]
 
δ∈∆ δ. A formula of this form is said to
fully describe C’s choices. It is easy to see that we have the following. Let
∆ ⊆ Ω.
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Exclusive disjunctions ϕ▽ψ play an important role in our proofs. More-
over, if Φ is a set of formulas, then we deﬁne ▽ϕ∈Φϕ to be true iﬀ exactly
one of the ϕ’s is true. Note that Γ |= [C](ωi ∨ ωj) ↔ [C](ωi▽ωj) when
i  = j: using the deﬁnition of [C] and contraposition this is the same as
Γ |=  C ¬(ωi▽ωj) ↔  C ¬(ωi ∨ ωj). Now, syntactically,  C ¬(ωi▽ωj) is
equivalent to  C ((ωi∧ωj)∨¬(ωi∨ωj)). But, inspecting the truth-deﬁnition
of  C , this is again equivalent to  C ¬(ωi∨ωj) since the Lo formula ωi∧ωj
is never true.
So, which properties can be expressed with our cooperation language of
coalition game logic (cgl)? The answer, given by the following theorem, is
“all”, when we restrict the possible outcomes of a game to a ﬁnite set.
THEOREM 13. The logic cgl is expressively complete with respect to ﬁnite
coalitional games. That is, for any two ﬁnite coalitional games Γ1,Γ2 such
that Γ1  = Γ2, there exists a cgl formula ζ such that Γ1 |= ζ and Γ2  |= ζ.
3.1 Properties of cgl
Elsewhere we presented an axiomatic system for the language Lc, and
proved its soundness and completeness with respect to the class of all ﬁ-
nite coalitional games without transferable payoﬀ. Of course, this contains
axioms guaranteeing that ⊒i is a complete, reﬂexive and transitive order.
On top of that, there are the modal principles for 2C and the property
[C](▽ω∈Ωω) which says that whatever a coalition choses, must be a unique
alternative from Ω.
It is trivial to see that the model checking problem for cgl (i.e., the
problem of determining, for any given game Γ and ϕ, whether or not Γ |=
ϕ) may be solved in deterministic polynomial time: an obvious recursive
algorithm for this problem can be directly extracted from the semantic
rules of the language. The satisﬁability problem is the problem of checking
whether or not, for any given ϕ there exists a game Γ such that Γ |= ϕ.
For most modal logics, the corresponding satisﬁability problem has a trivial
np-hard lower bound, since such logics subsume propositional logic, for
which satisﬁability is the deﬁning np-complete problem [BdRV01, p.374].
However, our logic is specialised for reasoning about coalitional games, and
it is not so obvious that it subsumes propositional logic, since we do not
have primitive propositions. np-hardness must therefore be proven from
ﬁrst principles. We only give the result:
THEOREM 14. The satisﬁability problem for cgl formulae is np-complete,
even for cgl formulae ϕ such that |ag(ϕ)| = 1.24 Thomas ˚ Agotnes, Paul E. Dunne, Wiebe van der Hoek, and Michael Wooldridge
3.2 Solution Concepts
Elsewhere, we characterised three solution concepts from the theory of coali-
tional games, viz. the core, stable sets and the bargaining set in cgl. We
used the formulations of these solution concepts in [OR94]; there the two
latter solution concepts are however deﬁned only for games with real num-
bered payoﬀs and transferable utility and below we translate the deﬁnitions
to the more general games with preference relations over general outcomes
and non-transferable utility. We here demonstate the ﬁrst two concepts.
Henceforth, a C-feasible outcome is an outcome which can be chosen by the
coalition C and a feasible outcome is an A-feasible outcome. We start by
looking at the core, which is a, possibly empty, set of outcomes.
DEFINITION 15 (Core). The core of a coalitional game is the feasible
outcomes ω for which there is no coalition C with a C-feasible outcome ω′
such that ω′ ≻i ω for all i ∈ C.
We write CM(ω) to mean that ω is in the core.
CM(ω) ≡  A ω ∧ ¬


 
C⊆A
 
ω′∈Ω
( C ω′) ∧
 
i∈C
(ω′ ≻i ω)


CNE will then mean that the core is non-empty: CNE ≡
 
ω∈Ω CM(ω)
THEOREM 16. The core of a ﬁnite coalitional game Γ is non-empty iﬀ
Γ |= CNE.
A stable set is a set of outcomes. A coalitional game may have several
stable sets, but must not necessarily have any. We characterize stable sets
in terms of imputations and objections. An imputation is a feasible outcome
that for each agent i is as least as good as any outcome the singleton coalition
{i} can choose on his own. The cgl formula IMP(ω) is true whenever ω is
an imputation:
IMP(ω) ≡  A ω ∧
 
ω′∈Ω
 
i∈A
( {i} ω′ → ω  i ω′)
An imputation ω is a C-objection to an imputation ω′ if every agent in
C prefers ω over ω′ and the coalition C can choose an outcome which for
every agent in C is as least as good as ω. ω is an objection to ω′ if ω is
a C-objection to ω′ for some coalition C. Next, OBJ(ω,ω′,C) expresses
that outcome ω is an C-objection to outcome ω′, when both ω and ω′ are
imputations:
OBJ(ω,ω′,C) ≡ (
 
i∈C
ω ≻i ω′) ∧
 
ω′′∈Ω
( C ω′′ ∧
 
i∈C
ω′′  i ω)Logics for Coalitional Games 25
DEFINITION 17 (Stable Set). A set of imputations Y is a stable set if it
satisﬁes: (Internal stability) If ω ∈ Y , there is no objection to ω in Y , and
(External stability) If ω  ∈ Y , there is an objection to ω in Y .
Now consider
STABLE(Y ) ≡
 
ω∈Y IMP(ω)
∧
  
ω∈Y
 
C⊆A
 
ω′∈Y ¬OBJ(ω′,ω,C)
 
∧
  
ω∈Ω\Y IMP(ω) →
  
C⊆A
 
ω′∈Y OBJ(ω′,ω,C)
  
THEOREM 18. Y is a stable set of a ﬁnite coalitional game Γ iﬀ Γ |=
STABLE(Y ).
3.3 Relation to Coalition Logic
As we noted in section 3, it is rather tempting to believe that the outcomes
of coalitional games can be interpreted as states, and that the characteristic
function can be interpreted as an eﬀectivity function, and that as a conse-
quence cl could be interpreted directly in coalitional games. We now argue
that in fact there is a fundamental diﬀerence between the two approaches.
We say that a coalitional game Γ and a pointed coalition model M,t are
outcome-equivalent if S = Ω ∪ {t}, and Γ and (M,t) agree on Lc formulae
and (Γ,ω) and (M,ω) agree on Lo formulae for any outcome ω. Consider
the class of limited games where V (C) = {ω} for all coalitions C  = A, for
some ﬁxed outcome ω ∈ Ω.
THEOREM 19. No non-limited coalitional game with more than one player
has an outcome-equivalent coalition model.
Thus, in general, a coalitional game is not simply a coalition model with
outcomes as states. Even though the language of Coalition Logic is similar
to the language of our logic, it follows from Theorem 19 that we cannot use
the semantic rules of Coalition Logic “directly” to say whether a formula
is true or not in a coalitional game. The main reason is that a diﬀerence
between outcomes in coalitional games and states in coalition models is that
an outcome is local to the coalition which chooses it, while states are global.
As a consequence, while it is perfectly possible in a coalitional game that
both a coalition C can choose outcome ω (ω ∈ V (C)) and a coalition C′,
C′ and C disjoint, can choose outcome ω′ (ω′ ∈ V (C′)) when ω′  = ω, it is
not possible in a coalition model that both C is eﬀective for {ω} and C′ is
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4 Related Work
Recently, game theory has come to be seen as an attractive foundation
upon which to develop logic-based knowledge representation formalisms for
multi-agent systems. It has been recognised for several decades that there
are close links between modal logics of rational agency and the formal the-
ory of games: see, for example, Ladner and Reif’s Church/Turing-like thesis
for distributed computing, and the conclusions they draw from this [LR86,
pp.208–209]. Recently, a number of formalisms have been proposed which
attempt to synthesise logical and game-theoretic approaches in a single
system, in which the links between the game and the logic are explicitly
deﬁned (for a survey, see [vdHP06]). Explorations have been undertaken
by van Benthem, whose starting point is that the labelled transition sys-
tems/Kripke structures, which are canonically used to give a semantics to
modal logics, can be interpreted as extensive form games, and that as a
consequence modal operators of various kinds can be used to express prop-
erties of games [Ben02]. However, to the best of our knowledge, our work
is the ﬁrst to present a systematic logical characterisation of concepts from
cooperative games.
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